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Part one of this paper is devoted to a general critique of elite 
studies. Attention is called to theoretical and methodological short­
comings, as well as to the paucity in comparative elite analysis which 
is thought of as the most promising avenue of development in elite 
theory. The paper then proceeds to study cross nationally approx­
imately 400 ministerial elites in Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon by the use 
of factor analytic and path analytic techniques. Specifically, two 
hypotheses have been tested comparatively: (II Societal charac­
teristics. values and aspirations tend to lx· reflected in recruit­
ment patterns, thereby shaping the collective profile of the elite; and 
(2| Salient social background characteristics—of ministers—sociali- 
zational and associational—influence tenure in cabinet office.
In hypothesis 2, tenure in high office is treated as the focal point of 
the elite circulation process. Tenure is conceived of as a dynamic and 
theoretically potent variable. It is posited that tenure in cabinet is in­
fluenced by psychological attributes of leaders, as well as by systemic 
and situational variables which include the associational deter­
minants found in the social backgrounds of ministerial elites.
To test hypothesis 2, the tri-country recruitment data was used to 
develop causal models based on standardized regression coefficients. 
It was discovered that tenure was significantly (46%—57% in­
fluenced by social background characteristics in (lie three countries. 
The path models further suggested that longevity in high office may 
be more strongly influenced by a leader’s associational affiliation 
(social background) rather than personal attributes.
A methodological discussion of the equivalence problem and sug­
gestions for further comparative elite research conclude the paper.
More than a decade has elapsed since Harold Lasswell’s 
«Agenda» and the study of political elites continues to 
display «intellectual vigor».1 Yet despite the great pro­
liferation of elite studies in recent years,2 the Lasswellian 
observation that the field of elite studies lacks «intellectual 
unity» remains a fitting criticism. While Lasswell’s early 
vision about the centrality of elites to the study of politics 
may have been overly optimistic,3 leaders and leader­
ship have returned to concern political scientists who, 
for a variety of reasons,4 have been less than successful 
in developing elite theory. Indeed, it can be argued that 
elite studies have not registered theoretical and method­
ological advances comparable to other areas of political 
science. One plausible reason for the underdeveloped 
state of the field may be the paucity of comparative elite
1. Harold D. Lasswell, «Agenda for the Study of Political Elites», 
in Dwaine Marvick, ed., Political Decision-Makers (New York: Free 
Press, 1961), p. 264.
2. One recent compilation lists about 530 such studies, see William 
B. Quandt, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage, 1970).
3. Lester G. Seligman,«The Study of Political Leadership», 
American Political Science Review, Voi. 44, No. 4 (Dec. 1950) pp 
904-15.
4. Perhaps the main reason is ideological. We like to think of 
ourselves as living in an egalitarian, pluralistic society where the 
distinction between elites and masses is thought to be blurred. This 
kind of thinking seems to have produced a relative decline of research 
on American elites. See, R. Hrair Dekmejian, Patterns of Political 
Leadership: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon(Albany: SUN Y Press, 1975), pp.
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studies. A primary aim of this study is to suggest the 
potential of comparative elite analysis for theoretically 
and methodologically significant research in the field of 
political leadership.
the state of elite studies: a critique
A number of shortcomings become apparent when 
one reviews the literature on elites. The following fac­
tors, in combination, seem to have hampered the 
development of elite theory.
1. Quantification vs. Theory. A substantial portion of 
the published research on elites—particularly social 
background-circulation studies—is quantitatively bas­
ed. But, as Rustow once suggested, many such studies 
are theoretically barren.5 Nor has the situation changed 
radically in recent years. Faced with the existing state 
of elite theory, or perhaps, lacking interest in theory, 
many scholars have plunged ahead with the arduous 
task of collecting and collating social background data, 
without the benefit of a theoretical structure of frame­
work.
Quantification in elite studies needs little justifica­
tion. Not only does quantitative data contribute to 
overall precision and elegance, but it also facilitates 
longitudinal and cross-national types of analyses of elite 
groups. Also a powerful case can be made for gathering 
quantitative data as an initial step in inductive analysis 
that would lead to the derivation of empirically sound 
theoretical insights. In practice however, the inductive 
road has not led to substantial theory-building in elite 
studies. Lastly, many quantitatively oriented resear­
chers are area or country specialists whose aim is to pre­
sent a collective profile of the political elite rather than 
attempt to derive theoretical insights on elite-system 
relationships. A common shortcoming in such cases is 
too narrow a focus on leaders and leadership which 
tends to be seen in isolation from the other components 
of the political system. This often leads to a static view 
of an elite aggregate, instead of the dynamic perspective 
that is necessary if one is to study the interaction be­
tween elite composition and system transformation.
2. Methodological Problems. Students of leadership also 
have been plagued by definitional questions; particular­
ly acute is the perennial boundary problem—the deter­
mination of what constitutes an elite.6 Equally serious 
is the underdeveloped state of methodology in elite 
studies. It is surprising that many scholars who have
5. Dankwart A. Rustow, «Who’s Who, When and How», World 
Politics. Voi. IB. No. 4 (1966) p. 716.
6. Frederick W. Frey,«The Determination and Location of Elites:
A Critical Analysis», paper delivered at 66th Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California,
8-12 September 1970. Also, William I. Zartman, «The Study of Elite
Circulation», Comparative Politics, Voi. 7. No. 3 (April 1974), pp 
466-70; and Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership, pp. 3-7.
amassed social background data have gone no further 
than calculating simple correlations.7 Few have discern­
ed, for example, the analytical power of systems theory, 
or logistic processes, or the usefulness of factor analysis, 
path analysis, and Markov chain probabilities, par-' 
ticularly in the study of recruitment paths and elite cir­
culation in general.8
3. Lack of Comparative Thrust. Despite the relative 
abundance of studies on leadership, genuinely com­
parative analyses of leaders and leadership are in­
credibly few. This might well be the most important 
obstacle to the development of elite theory.
The scholarly literature on comparative elites may be 
categorized in several ways. One might distinguish 
single-leader comparative studies (e.g., Wolfenstein, 
Rustow, Merriam, Barber, Hargrove) from those com­
paring groups of elites (e.g., Lasswell, Deutsch) or those 
dealing analytically with the general field of leadership 
(e.g., Bottomore, Parry, Greenstein, Putnam). Alter­
natively, one might classify these studies by type of 
comparative framework: unified versus disparate. 
Significantly, only a handful of the existing com­
parative studies of leaders—either as individuals or as 
groups—possess unified, common theoretical-method­
ological frameworks9—a serious shortcoming from the 
point of view of comparability of data. The rest are edited 
collections of leader and country studies, either totally lack­
ing an integrated single theoretical frame or possessing one 
that is too nebulous for comparative utility. While some of 
these anthologies are valuable in themselves as elite studies, 
their contribution to comparative elite analysis is limited. 
Thus, despite its perceived potential for the generation of 
elite theory, the comparative study of elites remains an un­
charted area of research. It is significant, for example, 
that so few students10 of leadership have recognized the 
problem of equivalence in comparative elite analysis.
We shall not attempt to confront, much less resolve 
here, all of the complex problems of elite analysis iden-
7. Some exceptions are R.S. Robins, «Elite Career Patterns as a 
Differential in Regional Analysis: A Use of Correlation Techniques 
and the Construction of Uniform Strata», Behavior Science, Voi. 14 
(May 1969), pp. 232-8; Carl Beck, «Leadership Attributes in Eastern 
Europe: The Effect of Country and Time», and M. George 
Zaninovich, «Elites and Citizenry in Yugoslav Society: A Study in 
Value Differentiation», inCarl Beck et al.. Comparative Communist 
Political Leadership (New York: David McKay, 1973), pp. 86-163 
and 226-297 respectively;
8. See R.H. Dekmejian, «Elite Recruitment, Markov Chains, and 
Path Analysis: Israel, Egypt and Lebanon», paper delivered at the 
70th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
Chicago, Illinois, 28 August-2 September 1974. Also see Kl.S. 
Koutsoukis’, 'Elites and Society in Modern Greece: Cabinet Circula­
tion and Systemic Change: 1946-1974. Unpublished Ph. D. Disserta­
tion, St. University of New York, at Binghamton, 1976.
9. These include studies by J.D. Barber, Wolfenstein, C. Merriam, 
Hargrove, Lasswell and Lerner, and Eulau et al.
10. Marvick, Political Decision-Makers, pp. 18-20; Dekmejian, Pat­
terns..., pp. 2-9.
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tified above. However, the analysis that is to follow will 
involve some of the conceptual and methodological 
tasks associated with cross-national elite studies, par­
ticularly theory-building, equivalence, and statistical 
applications. Our specific purpose is to examine com­
paratively patterns of social background characteristics 
of cabinet-level elites in three Middle Eastern polities— 
Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon. We further plan to search 
for possible relationships among salient social back­
ground variables, system-specific priorities and length 
in tenure in cabinet positions.
Theoretical Underpinnings
We begin at the level of meta-theory by reiterating 
the view held by various students of leadership that the 
elite is'a reflection of society." For example, Gaetano 
Mosca maintained that the composition of the elite 
reflected the balance of social forces in a given society.11 2 
Lasswell was even more specific in his restatement of 
the famous Marxian hypothesis, i.e., a positive relation­
ship exists between the position of a group in the pro­
duction process and its position in the political 
process.13 It is also possible to deviate from the causal 
direction of economic determinism and theorize that 
both in composition and performance the elite mirrors 
the configuration of social forces given a certain time 
lag for adjustments to take place as changes in social 
forces change the elite and/or vice versa. Implicit is a 
close relationship between elite recruitment and social 
change, or as Seligman states, «recruitment patterns 
both reflect and affect society».14 Clearly, recruitment 
patterns (i.e., elite composition), become a dependent 
variable reflective of a society’s political culture, social 
forces, and values. But also recruitment, treated as an 
independent variable, can influence systemic stability.15
To be able to formulate a more specific hypothesis, 
the themes of elite legitimacy and representation need 
to be introduced when considering recruitment pat­
terns. One may begin with the assumption that 
regardless of system type most ruling elites are in­
terested in maximizing their own legitimacy and the 
overall legitimacy of the political-social system they 
represent. According to Dahl, elites seek to convert rule 
by naked force to authority—which is legitimate—
11. Geraint Parry, Political Elites (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1969), p. 102. Also, W.L. Guttsman, The British Political 
Elite (London: MacGibbons and Kee, 1963), p. 32.
12. Parry, Political Elites, p.59.
13. Lasswell, «Agenda...»,p. 276.
14. Lester G. Seligman, «Elite Recruitment and Political 
Development», Journal of Politics, Voi. 26, No. 3 (August 1964), pp. 
612-13. For a comparative analytical study of elite transformation in 
selected post-industrial societies, see Robert D. Putnam, The Com­
parative Study of Elites (forthcoming), Chapter 8.
15. Ibid, and Quandt, The Comparative Study..., pp. 195-7.
because this type of rule is more reliable, durable, and 
efficient.16
The specific methods or strategies that elites use to 
legitimize themselves are various depending on the im­
peratives of their respective socio-political milieux. If 
one were to use Weber’s trilogy of «ideal» authority 
types, the quest for legitimacy could be perceived as the 
process by which particular elites strive to create a con­
gruence and identification between themselves and the 
system. However, a distinction needs to be made be­
tween Weber’s traditional and ration-legal types, and 
charismatic authority. Both traditional and rational- 
legal type authority environments usually imply stable 
situations where patterns of elite recruitment are 
substantially institutionalized. In such societies recruit­
ment patterns (i.e., elite composition) will tend to reflect 
the prevailing values, mores and goals which are either 
hallowed through tradition and/or are legally instituted 
through routinized rational processes.17 It follows that 
newly-recruited elites in these two types of social setting 
already possess initial legitimacy bestowed upon them 
by the accepted or institutionalized process of recruit­
ment through which they came to the top. Therefore, 
their quest for continued legitimacy would involve 
identification with and pursual of the prevailing values 
and goals of their respective societies. In sharp contrast 
is the revolutionary milieu associated with charismatic 
authority where the leader is committed to the destruc­
tion of the status quo, i.e., traditional and/or rational- 
legal authority. Thus, the leader’s quest for legitimacy 
involves charisma—his ability to establish an intense 
spiritual bond with his followers by the effective pro­
pagation of a chiliastic message accompanied by his 
order-destroying and order-creating capabilities.18 In 
charismatic environments the leader and the elite con­
tingent around him will legitimize their initial recruit­
ment by charisma and continue to justify the emerging 
patterns of recruitment, i.e., elite composition, in terms 
of the new ideological goals of the revolution as pro­
pounded by the charismatic’s message.
The foregoing discussion suggests the following 
hypothesis:
1. Societal characteristics, values, and aspirations 
tend to be reflected in recruitment patterns, thereby 
shaping the collective profile of the elite
In order to test this hypothesis, it will first be necessary 
to sketch briefly the social-political environments in
16. Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 19.
17. For some reflections of this in the Greek political context see, 
Kl.S. Koutsoukis, «Socioeconomic Change and Cabinet Composition 
in Greece: 1946-1974», in The Greek Review of Sodai Research, No. 
32 (January-April 1978), pp. 76-79.
18. Edward Shils. «Cnarisma, Order and Status». American 
Sociological Review. Voi. 30 (April 1965), p. 204.
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Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon to identify major societal 
values, concerns and priorities. These will then be com­
pared with clusters of elite background characteristics 
to discern the degree of correspondence, if any, be­
tween them.
Israel: A Garrison Democracy
There is no more fitting description of Israel than 
J.C. Hurewitz’s appellation of the Jewish state—«a 
garrison democracy».19 In order to identify the socializa- 
tional and motivational sources of Israeli behavior, several 
basic historical determinants need to be mentioned.20
Israel is a new state with an old people. Israel’s ex­
perience in nation-building is unique since it had long 
preceeded the settlement of the land. Here was a nation 
looking for a land to build a state. The quest for ter­
ritory—the return to Zion—had been prompted by 
heightened persecution of European Jews, particularly 
in the Tzarist Empire. The Zionist solution to the 
Jewish condition of permanent insecurity was the 
establishment of a Jewish political entity in Palestine. 
Yet even the founding of the state in 1948 was not suf­
ficient to fulfill the Zionist promise; Jewish insecurity 
persisted because the Arab’s rejection of Israel had the 
effect of transforming the new state into a Middle 
Eastern ghetto. In perceptual terms, the Jews’ collec­
tive historical memory of persecution and massacre was 
reinforced by Arab «encirclement» and persistent 
threats; hence the Israeli obsession with survival and 
defense.
The foregoing description of Israel’s developmental 
milieu suggests yet another priority: the need for aliya 
—Jewish seulement of Palestine. Indeed, as a settler state 
and society, continued immigration was imperative for 
survival. In order to maximize immigration to build a 
new state it was necessary to develop a nationalist 
ideology that would include a settlers’ or pioneers’ 
mystique, a devotion to working the land and a hard- 
boiled, defiant and proud activism—all symbolized by 
the kibbutz. These values were brought together in a 
«beginning of ideology» framework, strongly collec­
tivist and socialist, but tempered with Judaism and 
Western democratic ideals.
The tasks of nation-building—immigration, settle­
ment, and defense—required organization and leader­
ship cadres. The bureaucratic apparatus that developed 
under Ben Gurion in Mandatory Palestine had to con­
front the burdens of ruling a state after May 1948.
19. See J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimen­
sion (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 357.
20. See R. H. Dekmejian and M. J. Wyszomirski, «Strategic
Perceptions and the Arab-Israeli Conflict», paper presented at the
Middle East Studies Association Conference, Boston. Mass.., 6-9 
November 1974.
What followed has been aptly described as «forced» or 
«pressure cooker» development,21 to build a viable and 
strong state in the shortest possible time; this despite the 
uncertainties of coalition politics exacerbated by a 
multi-party system and an electorate which has per­
sistently denied a parliamentary (knesset) majority to 
any of the main parties. Thus, inter-party relations are 
of primary interest in forming viable cabinet coalitions. 
Here emerges the pivotal role of rabbi-ministers, most 
of whom exercise great influence on government 
policies and cabinet stability as the heads of the 
religious parties in Israel’s ruling coalitions.
Egypt: Charisma and Praetorianism
The formative event in the national experience of to­
day’s Egyptians is the July 1952 Revolution which 
began as a coup by young military officers. Despite its 
manifest authoritarianism, the revolutionary regime 
under Nasir succeeded in gathering substantial legitimacy 
by pursuing policies which corresponded to the psycho­
logical and political needs and expectations of the Arab 
masses, in and out of Egypt. In summary form, the main 
sources of legitimacy for the Nasirite revolution were 
its indigenousness, and its commitment to nationalism 
and socio-economic development.
The overthrow of the Turkish-Albanian monarchy in 
1952 symbolized the end of a long period of servitude 
under many non-Egyptian rulers. The Nasirite military 
elite was the first ethnically Egyptian group to rule 
Egypt since the last pharaoh.22
While the military takeover fulfilled the millenial 
quest of Egyptians to be governed by their own kind, 
two major obstacles remained in the way of stable na­
tional development: the British presence and Israel’s 
existence. The British had entered Egypt in 1882 and 
showed no signs of departing. As to Israel, the Egyp­
tians regarded it as a creation of Western imperialism 
for the purpose of dominating the Arab world. After 
the Egyptian defeat in 1948, Israel began to be perceiv­
ed as a major threat to Egypt’s security. Essentially 
both the British and Israeli problems involved Egyptian 
national pride and security—two primary concerns of 
the military regime. Nasir’s response to these deeply 
felt popular needs included defiance of the West, mixed 
with skillful diplomacy aimed at British departure, ac­
quisition of modern weapons from the USSR which 
had been denied to him by the West, and the creation 
of a Pan-Arab movement aimed at Israel and the two 
superpowers. By the late fifties Nasir’s bold actions 
had been instrumental in making him a charismatic 
hero in the eyes of Arab masses despite another defeat
21. Benjamin Akzin and Hehezkel Dror, Israel: High-Pressure 
Planning {Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1966).
22. Dekmejian, Patterns... p., 170.
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by Israel and the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez 
Canal in 1956.23
Another source of legitimacy was the military’s ear­
ly commitment to socio-economic reform and com­
prehensive development to achieve a modicum of social 
justice. The agrarian reform laws of 1952 and 1961 
were intended to make landless peasants small land- 
owners. A massive higher education system was creat­
ed by the Revolution to (keep pace with the country’s 
modernization. After 1961 Nasir began a new phase of 
accelerated development under the ideological rubric of 
Arab Socialism—what one might call the «routiniza- 
tion of charisma» in Weberian terminology. The specific 
measures were etatistic—virtually all large and medium 
size enterprises were nationalized and brought under 
the control of a large body of bureaucrats and techno­
crats many of whom were the products of Egypt’s new­
ly-expanded university system. These steps, coupled 
with the redistribution of large landholdings, had the 
effect of liquidating the small capitalist and feudalist 
groups and pushing wealth downward to the growing 
middle and lower middle classes.24
Lebanon: A Sectarian Democracy
In sharp contrast to Israel and Egypt, Lebanon’s is 
an «end of ideology» political culture. Lebanon emerg­
ed from French imperial rule (1945) as a thoroughly 
capitalistic, heterogeneous, and pluralistic democracy. 
Like Israel, Lebanon is a substantially urbanized society 
with a high rate of literacy. Yet for the Lebanese, 
economic development is not synonymous with large- 
scale industrialization but with the maintenance of a 
highly modernized service-oriented economy of com­
merce, finance, and tourism, in addition to small in­
dustry and agriculture. The entrepreneurial-financial 
dimension increased substantially after the advent of 
large-scale oil production in the Arab countries.
The most important systemic feature besides the en­
trepreneurial milieu, is sectarianism, i.e., the Lebanese 
political system is based on a unique confessional 
balance that makes it possible for the country’s seven 
main sects and ethnic groups to come together to run 
the governmental structure. Thus, the proportional 
representation of each of the seven culturally autonomous 
minorities in government constitutes the linch-pin of the 
system. In some fundamental ways the Lebanese confes­
sional system resembles what Lipjhart has called «consocia-
23. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political 
Dynamics (Albany: SUNY Press, 1971 and London: University of 
London Press, 1972), pp. 40-63, 225-51.
24. Ibid., pp. 119-43, 244-85.
25. Arend Lijphart, «Consociatìonal 'Democracy», World Politics,
Voi. 21 (January 1969L pp. 207,225 and Hans Daalder, «The Con-
tional democracy».25 In the Lebanese case, however, the 
consociatìonal system possesses a peculiar elite type—the 
za’im (pi. zu’ama’)—who is recruited from various sects 
through the electoral process.26 The zu’ama’ are tra­
ditional type leaders who usually come to exercise in­
fluence over a client group centered in one geographical 
area by virtue of family prestige, wealth, and/or ability 
to protect and promote the client’s interest—the latter 
resembling the «fix it» functions of the American ur­
ban political boss.27 Therefore the inter-and intra­
sectarian elite competition for political power at the top 
takes place between the various zu’ama’, the relative 
power of which is subject to considerable fluctuation, 
partly depending on the outcome of electoral contests.
This unique system of multi-sectarian equilibrium 
has proved workable when left alone. When faced with 
external threat or intervention, however, the system 
tends to breakdown as in the case of the Syrian involve­
ment in Lebanon’s 1958 crisis and the protracted 
Palestinian-Israeli armed confrontatioa since the June 
1967 War. Yet it is significant that Lebanon continues 
to maintain one of the world’s smallest armies (10,000 
men), its confessional internal structure remains intact, 
and the entrepreneur’s pragmatism remains the order 
of the day.
units of analysis and data collection
It should be noted that our first hypothesis was 
stated in general terms, i.e., it referred to the collective 
profile of the elite but did not specify the boundaries of 
the elite. Without belaboring the perennial methodolo­
gical question of what is an elite, we have determined, 
on the basis of area expertise, that in the three political 
systems under study the cabinet provides a convenient 
and manageable unit of cross-national analysis. The 
cabinet elite was chosen because it meets the following 
criteria of nominal, structural, and functional equiva­
lence:28
1. The possession of a disproportionate amount of 
political power relative to all other groups and indi­
viduals in society.
2. The sharing of a private political culture, distinct 
from the mass culture, in which the leaders have 
more in common with each other than with their 
constituents.
3. The possession of significant mutual ties—econo­
mic, political, matrimonial, familial, socializational 
—all of which bring together the elite in a network
sociational Democracy Theme», World Politics. Voi. 26 (July 1974), 
pp. 604-21.
26. On the zu’ama’ see, Arnold Hottinger, «Zu’ama’ in Historical 
Perspective», in Politics in Lebanon, edited by Leonard Binder (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 86-105.
27. Fred I. Greenstein, The American Party System and the 
American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 38-53.
28. Dekmejian, Patterns....pp. 3-4.
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of interrelations uncharacteristic of most members 
of society.
4. The possesion of a self-view which emphasizes the 
uniqueness, exclusiveness, and political centrality 
of the group, i.e., the self-view of the group that it 
is an elite.
5. The existence of a widespread popular view that 
the group is an elite.
Data was collected on a number of social background 
characteristics for about 400 cabinet ministers—64 
Israelis, 186 Egyptians, and 159 Lebanese—who serv­
ed during roughly parallel periods of time from the for­
ties to the early seventies.29 These ministerial elites serv­
ed in 17 Israeli (1948-1973), 23 Egyptian (1952-1973), 
and 45 Lebanese (1943-1972) cabinets. It should be em­
phasized that our data only consists of social background 
variables and therefore our findings should be considered 
no more than partial explorations of aspects of elite re­
cruitment and circulation. For a more comprehensive 
study one needs to generate additional data, particularly 
on attitudinal and social-psychological variables. The 
present study was limited to social background data 
because these were more readily available and easily 
quantifiable.
Identification of Patterns: Factor Analysis
In the descriptive part of hypothesis 1, it was 
predicted that societal goals and aspirations would be 
reflected, at least to an extent, in the background pro­
file of a country’s top leadership i.e., the cabinet in the 
present context. To ascertain this, factor analysis is con­
sidered an appropriate technique since it will help { 
discern patterns or clusters of interrelated variables.30 
Thus, interrelated elite background characteristics are 
expected to be loaded on the same factor. Actually, 
these cluster-factors are reductions of a large number of 
social background variables, which constitute our raw 
data.
The 8MD x72 factor analysis technique was utilized 
with an oblique rotation which gives better clustering 
of variables.31 In addition oblique rotation was thought 
to be more appropriate because we assumed that 
background characteristics would have high inter­
correlations. However, of the three countries, Lebanon 
had factor correlations of r<.20, while Egypt and 
Israel were higher at r<.30. In retrospect it may be 
assumed that the factors tended to be orthogonal rather 
than oblique.
In the oblique rotation using Kaiser’s criterion 
(Eigen value 1.0), one has the benefit of getting as few
29. Ibid, and throughout the book.
30. R.J. Rummel, «Understanding Factor Analysis», Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Voi. 11 (1967), pp. 444-46.
31. W. J. Dixon, ed., Biomedical Computer Programs, X-Series
Supplement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 90-6.
factors as 1/6 or 1/3 of the original number of variables. 
Rotations were repeated to keep factors at more than 
3% of the total variance. This obviously minimized 
some of the communalities in favor of fewer factors.32
ISRAEL
Religious Orientation. The first pattern reveals a cluster 
of interrelated variables with a dominant religious 
character (see Table 1). This is because a large minority 
(22%) of the Israeli cabinet elite possess religious educa­
tional specialization (-.75) as well as rabbinical train­
ing (-.89), and occupation (-.89). Pattern 1 is signifi­
cant not only because it underlines the considerable 
clerical presence in the cabinet, but also because this 
pattern explicates the correlation between rabbinical 
ministerial backgrounds and their affiliation with the 
National Religious Party ( — .76). Indeed, these rabbi- 
ministers are the leaders of the religious parties whose 
presence in the cabinet has been so often crucial to 
maintain the Mapai-Ied coalition in power.33 
Specialization. Patterns II, III, IV, V, VI can be labelled 
specialization, although each represents a different 
aspect. Pattern II shows a clear contrast between 
specialists and generalists. Specialists are those whose 
educational specialization fits their ministerial posts 
(.83); the generalists are those who hold ministerial 
posts unrelated ( — .88) to their educational training.34 
Another high loading in this pattern is that of Historian- 
Humanist (.76), perhaps indicating the flexibility of a 
very general field in fitting cabinet posts. In Pattern III, 
occupational specialization is emphasized by high 
loadings on Master’s degrees ( — .89) and business 
( — .97). Members of the General Zionist/Liberal Party, 
known to be highly educated and business-oriented, 
have a high correlation (-.81), with the pattern. In 
contrast is the positive loading for ministers born in the 
Tzarist Empire (.52) who were known to have a strong 
socialistic orientation.35 In Pattern IV the fields of law 
(.85) and law-religion (.92) receive high loadings and 
journalism loads moderately (.51)—all indicating 
ministerial educational specializations. Pattern V shows 
clusters of mostly occupational specializations, with 
lawyers ( - .62), engineers ( - .62) and engineering ( - .70)
32. Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Quantitative Analysis of Political Data 
(Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Pubi. Co., 1974), p. 250.
33. See, Norman L. Zucker, The Coming Crisis in Israel (Boston: 
MIT Press,1973), pp. 43-59 and 222-25, and Leonard J. Fein, Politics 
in Israel (Boston: Little, Brown. 1967), pp. 173-80.
34. For example, a law specialization is considered « unrelated» to 
a cabinet post requiring technical expertise, e.g., Economy, 
Agriculture, Health. In contrast, law is considered as «related» to the 
Ministry of Justicq.
35. Alan Arian, Ideological Change in Israel (Cleveland: The Press 
of Case Western Reserve University, 1968), p. 59.
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TABLE 1 . Israel ■ Rotated Factor Matrix*
Variable 1 11 III IV V VI VII Vili Communality
1. Age .42 .11 -.01 -.10 (.64) .06 .13 -.04 .72
2. Age (Key Ministers) .18 -.04 .00 .13 .47 .03 (-.62) .05 .77
3. No Degree .43 —.24 .23 -.00 .16 .32 .09 -.37 .98
4. Bachelor’s Degree -.21 .14 .16 .19 -.13 1(-.75) -.13 .28 .98
5. Master’s Degree .05 -.04 ( — 89) .01 —.21 .01 .10 .04 .97
6. Doctorate -.31 .12 .03 -.32 .15 (.89) .04 .08 .96
7. Rabbinic Degree (-.89) —.00 .08 .11 -.18 .27 -.02 .11 .92
8. Related -.20 (.83) .03 —.02 .07 .06 -.09 .28 .94
9. Unrelated .19 (-.88) .21 -.23 -.09 -.31 .02 .14 .97
10. Worker/Farmer .28 —.36 .39 .11 .41 —.26 -.21 -.18 .96
11. Rabbi (-.89) .10 .00 -.05 —.04 -.09 .06 .07 .95
12. Lawyer .32 -.03 —.25 -.13 (-.62) -.02 -.08 (.60) .97
13. Zionist Bureaucrat -.04 .10 .20 -.15 -.10 -.03 (-.89) .01 .86
14. Hagana .10 .10 .16 -.06 —.00 (.76) .06 -.32 .93
15. Businessman .00 -.03 1 -.97) -.03 .11 —.14 .09 —.15 .96
16. Engineer —.21 .15 —.23 .13 (-.62) -.35 .13 -.06 .98
17. Journalist .24 .49 .41 (.51) .04 .12 .38 .02 .97
18. Academician .15 .04 .37 .03 .05 (.75) -.10 -.03 .96
19. Religious Studies (-.75) .17 —.13 -.06 -.09 -.30 -.12 —.01 .95
20. Law/Religion —.24 .07 —.04 (.92) .08 -.13 .10 -.08 .97
21. Law .07 .00 -.18 (.85) —.17 -.29 -.07 .12 .96
22. Engineering -.08 .14 —.19 -.35 (-.70) —.26 .10 .03 .97
23. Social Studies .02 .12 .06 -.39 -.06 .07 (.51) (.64) .91
24. Military Science .03 .21 .05 —.11 —.05 (.60) -.35 -.46 .88
25. History/Philosophy .26 (.76) .27 -.19 -.19 (-.55) .04 -.09 .94
26. Oriental Studies .15 .04 .37 .03 .05 (.75) -.10 -.03 .96
27. Economics/Business -.24 —.27 —.41 -.35 .46 —.47 —.01 -.12 .90
28. Agriculture .25 -.04 -.00 -.18 (.77) -.03 -.08 .28 .83
29. No Specialization .43 —.24 .19 -.02 .13 .33 .07 —.41 .97
30. Mapai —.16 .22 .11 -.36 .15 -.13 -.05 (.76) .97
31. Mapam .26 -.35 .43 .22 .21 .13 —.08 -.35 .97
32. National Religious Party (-.76) .14 .36 .10 -.23 ' —.11 .14 -.03 .94
33. General Zionist/Liberal .30 .03 11—81) .32 —.11 -.01 .08 .01 .90
34. Gahal .16 .01 -.15 -.25 —.26 .15 -.00 (-.82) .84
35. Tzarist Empire -.06 -.08 (.52) —.14 .25 —.49 .24 (-.51) .96
36. West Europe .30 .04 —.35 M5 —.19 -.13 -.20 (.53) .94
37. Middle East/other .43 .05 —.15 -.03 -.02 (.73) -.02 -.09 .90
Percent of Total Variance 36 15 12 9 7 7 6 3.5 93.5 Total
* Loadings with value .50 and higher are placed in brackets.
having negative correlatiorfs with the pattern, and agri­
culturalists (.77) who have a positive loading. One may 
observe that lawyers and engineers possessed high levels 
of formal education and professionalism unlike the agri­
culturalists who, history tells us, were none other than 
the early pioneering Zionist settlers of Palestine who 
mostly lacked college education. Here the patten may 
suggest a conflictual delineation between professionalist- 
expertise and practical-expertise. Finally, in Pattern VI 
educational level occurs with occupation: BA’s (-.75) 
opposed to Ph.D.’s. (.89) and academia (.75). Also a 
number of ministerial occupational sources of recruit­
ment are apparent—Haganah (.76), military (.60), and 
Orientalists (.75).36
Bureaucratic Careerism. The high loadings in Pattern 
VII on the categories of Zionist bureaucrat (- .89) and
36. The high positive loading on Middle Eastern-born ministers
could not be explained.
age of key ministers ( - .62) project a basic reality in 
Israeli politics which held true as late as 1974. This 
refers to the powerful bureaucratic elites around Ben 
Gurion who entered the Yishuv’s bureaucratic ap­
paratus during the inter-war years and emerged as key 
ministers afrer Israel’s independence; a significant 
number of them aged in office.37 
Party Affiliation. The main feature of Pattern VIII is 
the Mapai (.76) vs. Gahal (-.82) competition which 
symbolized the conflict between the leading «in» party 
and the main «out» party. This pattern also indicates 
that party affiliation may be related to occupational 
positions (lawyer .60; social scientist .64). Another dicho­
tomy that can be detected is a Western European (.53) 
vs. Tzarist Empire ( — .51) line-up.
37. The positive loading on Social Scientists can be explained when 
contrasted with the low level of education of most aging Zionist 
bureaucrats.
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Overall, it seems that the factor analysis of the 
Istradi data has provided some patterns which reflect 
dominant concerns, values, and orientations in Israeli 
society. One outstanding pattern is the presence of the 
religious leaders in coalition governments run by Ben 
Gurionite bureaucrats who had settled the land as 
Zionist activists. The concern with security is symbol­
ized by Hagana and military components; similarly, 
developmental concerns are reflected in the ministers’ 
specialization patterns.
EGYPT
Specialization. The most pronounced patterns in Egyp­
tian social background variables (see Table 2 ) are 
specialization, political generation cohorts, religion, and 
level of education. The first pattern (I) includes a cluster 
of variables indicative of various occupational and 
educational sources of recruitment—bureaucrat (.65), 
business (.76), diplomat (.87), economics (.84), social 
science ( — .78), military men ( — .52), and civilians (.52). 
These findings clearly show the civilian vs. military 
cleavage.38 Under Patterns V and VI one can also 
discern high loadings on variables indicating specializa­
tions in technical professsions—engineering (.93),
38. Dekmejian, Patterns... pp. 185-92.
technology (.84), and physicians ( — .89). These 
specialization categories are reflectiveof the accelerated 
development triggered by the 1952 Revolution. 
Generational Cohorts. Pattern II reveals a cluster of 
variables with age being the most distinctive (-.96). 
The remaining highly and moderately loaded variables 
may be interpreted thusly. Academics ( — .62) is a highly 
educated category and it has a negative correlation with 
the pattern, as does age ( — .96). In addition, the correla­
tion between academics and age is .63 or a common 
variance of 40%. Therefore academics can be regarded 
as an older cohort vis a vis Master’s holders (.65), 
businessmen (.58), «related» (.63) and «unrelated» (.87) 
which may be seen as younger and less educated 
cohorts. Since we know that the MA and the «unre­
lated» groups mostly consist of officers,39 Pattern II 
may be interpreted as consisting of two generational 
cohorts of generally older academicians vis a vis 
younger military officers.
Religion. Pattern III reveals another salient aspect of 
revolutionary Egypt—religious affiliation. Thus, Muslims 
and Copts load highly in opposite directions. In addi­
tion, the «related» variable ( — .52) with which the Cop­
tic group shows 38% variance, indicates a greater cor­
respondence between the Copts’ educational specializa­
tions and cabinet posts.
39. Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir..., p. 185.
TABLE 2: Egypt - Rotated Factor Matrix*
Variable 1 11 III IV V VI Communality
1. Age .09 (-.96) —.11 .31 .16 .00 .95
2. Officer Technocrat- -.26 -.37 .01 (.69) .11 —.05 .80
3. Military Officer (—7.52) .32 .10 .39 .20 —.20 .98
4. Civilian (.52) —.32 —.10 -.38 —.20 .20 .98
5. Muslim .08 .05 (1.01) -.02 —.00 -.01 .97
6. Copt -.07 -.03 (-1.00) .01 .02 .01 .98
7. Law .30 -.01 —.19 (-.61) —.28 —.30 .88
8. Medicine -.06 —.06 .28 .01 (-.89) .05 .84
9. Social Science (-.78) -.09 .05 -.00 —.15 .42 .76
10. Technology .00 .04 -.09 .03 .08 (.93) .86
11. Economics (.84) -.04 —.00 .01 -.09 (.09) .80
12. Bachelor’s Degree .30 —.06 —.19 (.83) -.31 -.00 .78
13. Master’s Degree —.47 (-.65) .01 .17 -.03 -.29 .96
14. Dolorate .04 -.31 —.06 (-.55) -.28 .38 .90
15. Related —.01 (.63) (-.52) .05 .10 .42 .89
16. Unrelated .08 (.87) —.16 -.00 .09 -.12 .91
17. Military —.49 .29 .12 .38 .27 —.21 .98
18. Bureaucrat (.65) —.44 —.12 -.21 .00 .08 .86
19. Businessman (.76) (.58) .06 .18 -.06 .16 .85
20. Lawyer .43 .27 —.22 (-.52) —.27 —.17 .96
21. Academician -.07 (-.62) .19 -.07 —.11 .46 .84
22. Diplomat (.87) —.09 .09 -.01 —.14 -.02 .86
23. Engineer .01 -.19 .24 -.12 (.84) .13 .81
Percent of Total Variance 37 21 11 9 6 5 89 Total
* Loadings with value .50 and higher are placed in brackets. ■
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Education: Level and Type. Pattern IV brings together 
a number of variables indicative of a contrast between 
high and low education: BA’s (.83) and Ph.D.’s ( — .55) 
Also this pattern reveals an important contrast in educa­
tional specialization: officer-technocrats (.69) vs. lawyers 
(-.61). This, indicates a declining importance of the 
legal profession in Egypt and its replacement by 
military technocrats recruited from the Army.
In summary, the factor analysis of Egyptian 
ministerial cohorts, produced several main patterns. 
Specialization, generational elites, religion and educa­
tion. A number of these patterns show considerable cor­
respondence with hypothesis 1 and its descriptive 
characteristics for the Nasirite political system. More 
specifically, the specialization and education patterns 
reflect the developmental goals of the Egyptian revolu­
tion as promulgated by Nasir and his successors. Here 
also one discerns the military vs. civilian dimension in 
Egyptian politics, which is further revealed in the 
generational cohort pattern. The presence of the 
military shows the security concerns of Egypt against 
Israel as well as the ideological priorities of an 
authoritarian revolutionary milieu.
LEBANON
Sectarianism. The first factor discerns a cluster of 
variables indicating the confessional affiliation of 
Lebanese ministers. It also manifests the intra-and inter­
sectarian competition that is a main feature of Lebanese 
political life. Thus, the country’s largest seven sects 
compete for cabinet posts according to preset constitu­
tional formulas. Under this system the four Christian 
sects—Maronites, Orthodox, Catholics, Armenians 
—occupy half of the cabinet seats, while the Muslim 
sects—Sunnis, Shi’ites, Druzes—are given the rest, ex­
cept in times of crisis when the formula is modified. 
More importantly, there is intense competition among 
the sects within the Christian and Muslim rubrics. 
These can be observed in a number of patterns. In Pat­
tern I, two Christian sects (Maronites = -.88; 
Catholics = .67) and two Muslim sects (Sunnis = 
- .94; Shi’ites = .70) are highly loaded; and in terms of 
polarities one may note the competition between them. 
In Pattern VII, Orthodox Christians (.85) and Muslim 
Drizes (.88) both are correlated positively, which may 
indicate an absence of excessive competition among
TABLE 3: l.elwium Rotated Factor Matrix*
Variable 1 II III l\ V VI VII vin IX Com·
munality
1. Age 1—.581 .23 - .00 .22 —.07 —.17 -.04 —.43 .18 .71
2. No College (.511 —.01 .05 (.62) —.21 .39 —.14 —.18 —.18 .85
3. Associate Degree -.22 .12 —.14 .01 (-.79) —.19 —.03 .09 —.11 .85
4. Baehelor/Licensate .20 22 .20 (-.76) —.01 .08 .03 —.16 .11 .85
5. Masters/L'ertiiicale —.21 -.31 -.11 .32 (.58) —.24 —.10 —.00 -.08 .69
6. Doctorate —.09 .21 .09 (.53) .20 -.24 .24 —.20 —.14 .68
7. Law -.13 —.19 .30 (-.75) .20 .05 .03 —.19 —.05 .84
8. Stx'ial Science .04 —.03 -.07 .05 (.63) .09 .08 (.66) -.25 .92
9. Medicine -.16 .07 .28 (.86) .13 .15 .13 —.03 —.01 .90
10. Engineering -.04 (.79) —.31 -.00 .12 .02 .00 -.05 .06 .78
11. Military Science .07 (-.61) —.34 .01 .10 —.37 —.11 -.26 .35 .82
,12. Humanities .22 .02 .09 -.08 —.10 (-.87) .01 .04 —.04 .78
1.3. No Speciali/ation —.02 —.26 -.02 .15 (-.85) —.03 -.05 .02 —.04 .90
14. Maronite (-.88) —.01 .04 .06 -.02 .16 —.09 -.02 .16 .87
15. Sunni (-.94) .02 .02 .03 .04 .06 —.06 .02 .12 .94
16. Shl’ite (.70) .11 .00 -.00 .14 -.02 .04 —.23 -.28 .79
17. Orthodox -.05 —.21 —.39 —.03 -.10 .02 (.85) .11 .04 .95
18. Catholic (.67) .21 .37 .02 .16 -.13 .18 —.06 .16 .C.3
19. Druze .22 .03 .15 .12 .03 —.04 (.88) —.07 .05 .93
20. Armenian .17 —.03 —.04 .04 — .05 -.06 -.08 —.04 (-.88) .84
21. Assembly .31 —.19 (.74) -.07 .00 .06 —.16 .06 —.18 .91
22. No Assembly -.32 .19 (-.74) .07 —.01 -.06 .16 -.07 .18 .91
23. Za’imism, Level 0 .01 -.22 (-.67) .09 —.14 —.01 -.04 .26 -.09 .68
24. Za'imism, Level 1 .16 (.68) -.18 .20 .21 -.26 —.10 .03 .13 .78
25. Za’imism, Level 2 .20 -.24 —.13 -.18 .23 .35 .12 (.67) -.21 .88
26. Za’imism, Level 3 -.19 -.22 (.91) .08 —.05 -.09 .04 .10 .09 .87
Percent of Total Variance 22 15 10 9 7 6 6 5 4 84 Total
* Loadings with value .50 and higher are placed in brackets.
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these sects. In Pattern IX, the smallest of the seven 
sects—the Christian Armenians—load negatively 
( - .88). Because of the very high loadings for the sects 
in Patterns I, VII, and IX, these may be labelled «sec­
tarianism» (see Table 3 ).
Za’imism. In attempting to label Patterns II, III, VIII, 
the unique variant of personal leadership in Lebanon 
—za’imism—becomes manifest; indeed it appears 
highly loaded in all three patterns. In Pattern III, the in­
terrelated variables with high loadings are high za’im­
ism (.91) and Assembly membership (.74) as opposed to 
no za’imism (-.67) and no Assembly membership 
(- .74). This pattern may give insight into another reali­
ty of Lebanese politics—the inter-correlation between 
strength of a za’im and membership in the legislature. 
It seems that Assembly membership may contribute to 
strengthening za’imist power and vice versa—a strong 
za’im may find it easier to gain election into the 
Assembly. Significantly, the correlation matrix in­
dicates that za’imism and Assembly membership share 
a high variance (40%) in contrast to no za’imism and 
Assembly membership which share a relatively low 
variance (19%).
In Pattern II, engineering (.79) is positively loaded 
with a low-level za’imism (.68), in contrast to the 
military which is negatively loaded (-.61). This means 
that an engineering specialization is not common 
among prominent za’ims, most of whom had a generally 
low-level of education. In Pattern Vili, middle-level 
za’imism (.67) and social science specialization (.66) are 
positively related to the pattern indicating that za’imism 
is higher among social scientists than among engineers. 
Educational Level and Specialization. Three patterns 
can be subsumed under this broad category. In Pattern 
IV, several variables are clustered indicating levels of 
education: those with a Bachelor’s level education (—.76), 
including law degrees ( — .75), are negatively related to 
this pattern, while the no college category (.62) and Ph. 
D.’s (.53) and MD’s (.86) are positively related. The two 
extremes—doctorates and no college—are often 
displaced by the influx of BA-holding ministers, par­
ticularly lawyers. In Pattern V, one finds the specializa­
tion dimension more pronounced than educational 
level. Thus, the no specialization variable (-.85) and 
the Associate degree level (- .79) (which also denotes a 
lack of specialization in the first two years of college), 
are negatively related to the pattern as opposed to social 
scientists (.63) and MA’s (.58) which denote high levels 
of specialization. Finally, in Pattern VI, the high 
loading on humanists (-.87) also denotes a high level 
of education and specialization.
In summary, the factor analysis of the background 
characteristics of Lebanese ministerial cohorts by 
cabinet yielded a number of significant patterns: sec­
tarianism, both in terms of ministerial affiliation and
competition; za’imism, with its three levels, denoting a 
leader’s relative power position vis a vis his peers; 
education level and specialization, reflecting a systemic 
concern with development (engineers, economists, 
physicians). These three patterns seem to correspond, to 
a large extent, with those patterns suggested in hypothesis 
1 and its predicted characteristics for Lebanon. The 
sectarian heterogeneity of the elite is clearly manifested 
as is the dynamics of the confessional balance in a pluralist 
society. The only dimension which does not clearly 
emerge from our analysis is the entrepreneurial-finan­
cial background of the elite. This, peculiarity may be 
explained by the absence of relevant variables, e.g., 
wealth or economic connections. Finally, although an 
«end of ideology» society, Lebanon seems to display 
recruitment patterns manifesting substantial traditional 
values and structures, e.g., za’imism, which influence 
the political mobility of cabinet officials.
determinants of tenure: path analysis
One major purpose of the foregoing factor analysis 
was parsimony. In each elite group a large number of 
social background variables were reduced to a few 
manageable ones, several of which are now to be utiliz­
ed as independent variables in a causal model. In order 
to describe the perceived relationships between these in­
dependent variables and a specific dependent variable 
—tenure in cabinet—the following hypothesis may be 
advanced:
2. Salient social background characteristics of mini­
sters—socializational and associational—influence 
tenure in cabinet office.
measurement of variables
The patterns derived from the factor analysis suggest 
the use of interval scales,40 along which each minister’s 
background characteristics were scaled. For each elite 
group, five independent variables were operational­
ized,41 in order to measure their effect on tenure. The
40. In all cases except three, interval scales have been used.
41. For Israel: Hagana-extent of involvement-high = 2. low= 1, none = 0: 
Birthplace-Tzarist Empire = 2, West Europe = 1. Middle East = 0; Occupa 
tional Status-Zionist/Bureaucrat = 2. Military — 1. professional/other = 0: 
Party-ruling coalition = 2. Opposition party=l. Independents/other = 0: 
Cabinet Rank-high cabinet post= 1, low cabinet post = 0.
For Egypt: Educational Level-PhD. = 5. MA = 4. BA = 3. No Col 
lege = 2. No Degree= I; Core Cadre-membership= 1, no membership = 0: 
Age (generational cohort) 30-39 = 5. 40-49 = 4. 50-59 = 3.60-69 = 2. 70 and 
up= I, under 30=0: Religion-Muslim = I, Copt = 0; Occupational Status 
Military = 7. Military - technocrat = 6. Academician = 5: Engincer = 4. 
Bureaucrat = 3. Businessman = 2. Lawyer = I.
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single dependent variable—tenure in cabinet of­
fice—was measured in years and scaled similarly in the 
three polities.42
The choice of tenure as the main dependent variable 
needs theoretical justification. One can begin by observ­
ing that tenure in office (as distinguished from recruit­
ment and disposition) is an essential part of the elite cir­
culation process which has not received any systematic 
treatment in elite studies. We consider tenure a dynamic 
and theoretically potent variable for a number of 
reasons. An important, and inadequately investigated, 
consideration is a fundamental hypothesis of elite 
theory : once in political office, leaders tend to max­
imize their tenures.
The hypothesis suggests that tenure is influenced by 
certain psychological attributes of leaders, as well as 
certain systemic situational variables which tend to con­
tribute to a leader’s political longevity. The recruitment- 
circulation data as presented here is insufficient to in­
vestigate the totality of this hypothesis. Theoretically, 
tenure in political office (like the acquisition of office) 
can be influenced by a combination of factors—per­
sonal and situational. Personality variables affecting 
tenure include a leader’s psychological attributes 
—drive, giftedness, resourcefulness—as well as so- 
cializational experiences—family life, education, and 
religion. Situational factors may be perceived as the 
totality of systemic, environmental, and associational 
determinants. Systemic and environmental deter­
minants include elections, inter-elite conflicts, turbulent 
social milieux, and international crises. However, 
associational determinants of tenure affect the elite 
more directly; these are occupational background, 
educational, economic and political affiliations, political 
generation (age cohorts), to mention the more obvious 
variables. It becomes evident that the social back­
ground data presented here belongs to the associational, 
and to a lesser extent, to the socializational category.43 
Therefore, the absence of data on the psychological at­
tributes and systemic environmental influences on elite 
tenure, is expected to contribute to the unexplained or 
residual variance thus limiting the explanatory power 
of social background variables.
The theoretical significance of tenure as a dependent 
variable becomes more pronounced in the case of high level
For Lebanon: Educational Level - Ph.D. =5, MA = 4, BA =3, 
A A = 2, No Degree=l; Occupational Status-Proprietor- 
Entrepreneur =5, Proprietor -Lawyer =4, Entrepreneur - Lawyer 
= 4, Proprietor = 3, Lawyer = 2, Physician, Engineer, or Bureaucrat 
= 1; Assembly-membership = 1, no membership =0; Za’imism-high 
= 3, middle =2, low =1, none =0; Sectarian Competitiveness- 
Maronites =5, Shi’ites =4, Orthodox = 3, Catholic=2, Sunnis=l, 
Druzes-Armenians = 0.
42. Tenure is measured similarly for the three countries-up to one 
year = 0, 1-5 yrs = 2, 6-10 yrs = 3,11-15 yrs = 4, 16 and up yrs =
43. For similar findings concerning the Greek political elite see,
Koutsoukis, Elites and Society..., pp. 231-254.
political positions, particularly tenure in cabinet office. 
As pointed out earlier, cabinet positions in all three 
political systems are both prestigious and powerful to 
the extent that an ambitious politician would consider a 
ministership the apex of his career. It follows that a 
longer cabinet tenure may be synonymous with success 
in politics.
causal models
The group of techniques associated with causal 
analysis includes the Simon-Blalock model, path 
analysis, and step-wise regression analysis. The early 
work on causal paths began in biometrics and sociology 
(Wright, Tukey, Kempthorne, Blau and Duncan, 
Blalock), and by the sixties political scientists had begun 
using it (Miller and Stokes, Alker, Goldberg, McCrone 
and Cnudde, \. Smith) mainly for studying political 
development and voting behavior. Here an attempt will 
be made to apply path analysis to test hypothesis 2—to 
determine the relative influences of salient elite 
background characteristics on length of tenure in 
cabinet.
The causal analysis consists of several steps: (1) cor­
relation runs of elite background data; (2) use of zero 
prediction equations to determine direct cause-effect 
relationships and to reduce weak linkages among the 
variables (minimum limit =.10); (3) regression of the 
endogenous on the exogenous variables; (4) the assign­
ment of standardized regression coefficients as path 
coefficients. As is customary to state in path analysis, 
the proposed causal models are recursive, linear, hierar­
chical and additive.44
44. For methodological discussions of causal analysis, see, Hubert 
M. Blalock Jr., Causai Inferences in Nonexperimental Research 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Rress, 1964), pp. 61-94. 
Hayward R. Alker, Jr., «Causal Influence and Political Analysis», in 
J.S. Bernd, ed., Mathematical Applications in Political Science 
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), pp. 7-43. Ar­
thur S. Goldberg, «Discerning a Causal Pattern Among Data on 
Voting Behavior», American Political Science Review, Voi. 60 
(1966), pp. 913-32. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., ed., Causal Models in the 
Social Sciences (Chicago: Aldine, 1971). G. David Garson, Handbook 
of Political Science Methods (Boston: Holbrook, 1971), pp. 216-25. 
See Kirkpatrick, Quantitative Analysis..., pp. 160-1 for justification 
of eliminating weak linkages by prediction equations. Examples for 
Israel: For A 456 in Model I r46 is cancelled thusly:
Model Predicted Actual Difference
Γ46Γ45 = Γ56 ,32x .42 = .13 .73 .60 keep
Γ46Γ56 = Γ46 ,32x .73 = .23 .42 .19 keep
Γ45Γ56 = Γ46 .42x .73= .30 .32 .02 erase
For reservations as to type of error in rejecting linkages, see Goldberg 
article cited above, footnote 22.
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ISRAEL
Five independent variables were chosen from the 
elite background patterns which emerged from the 
previous factor analysis. Model I presents an ordering 
of the causal assumptions based on knowledge of 
Israel’s history and political development. Thus, both 
birth place and Hagana involvement were relatively 
early experiences which implied an influence on oc­
cupation and party affiliation, both of which would be 
expected to have an impact on cabinet rank and 
ultimately cabinet tenure. The ordering of the arrows 
reflects the time sequences implicit in the theoretical 
assumptions. Weak linkages, as represented by broken 
lines in Model I have been eliminated by a series of 
prediction equations, which are used to calculate partial 
correlations between two variables, always controlling 
for the third variable. For instance, in Model I, Hagana 
affiliation influences cabinet tenure through cabinet 
rank rather than directly; thus, the Hagana-tenure 
linkage is weak and therefore removeable. In this man­
ner, the degree of fit of the data with the ordering of the 
variables is explicated; the results are shown in Model 
II.
In interpreting Model II, the standardized regression 
coefficients have been assigned to the main paths. 
These values were calculated by regressing the en­
dogenous on the exogenous variables and standardizing 
the resulting beta coefficients which then become beta 
weights or path coefficients.45 The beta weights indicate 
the amount of change in the dependent variable caused 
by standardized units of change in the independent 
variable controlling for the earlier variables.46
Model II suggests several direct and indirect linkages 
among the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. The key independent variable affecting 
cabinet tenure is cabinet rank through which all the 
other variables influence tenure. Thus, cabinet rank is 
directly influenced by the country of birth (.06) of 
Israeli ministers as well as their occupational status (. 12) 
and Hagana affiliation (.19). The Hagana variable is 
dominant since it also has a large indirect influence on 
cabinet rank through occupational status (.22) as does 
party affiliation (.78). Finally, the cumulative influence 
of all the variables is expressed through cabinet rank 
which is R = .74. It follows that the amount of varia­
tion explained by the independent social background 
variables is R2 = (.74)2 = .55 or 55%. This finding is 
consistent with our expectations as expressed earlier 
concerning the limitations of the explanatory power of 
social background characteristics as influencing length 
of tenure. The remaining unexplained variance—45% 
—may be attributed to variables other than elite social
45. Garson, Handbook....p. 196.
46. Kirkpatrick, Quantitative Analysis.... p. 191.
background characteristics, particularly the psycholo­
gical attributes of individual leaders and/or systemic 
and environmental determinants. Despite these limita­
tions the findings in Model II are consistent with Israeli 
political experience. In the early years of the Yishuv 
such associational activities as Hagana and Jewish com­
munal bureaucracies were central to the future leaders 
of Israel. The mutually influential relationship between 
party and occupation was politically significant since a 
leader’s occupational status in bureaucracies like Hi 
stadrut could well depend on his party standing. Also 
top Mapai party bureaucrats, by virtue of their being in 
power for long periods, increased their cabinet rank and 
their tenure in cabinet. The powerful influence of ca­
binet rank (.74) on tenure is attributable to the ability of 
high ranking ministers to skillfully dominate Israeli coa­
lition politics sufficiently to return to office with great 
frequency. Since cabinet rank emerges as a unique de­
terminant of tenure, one may want to calculate possible 
independent influences on it. Thus, occupation, birthplace 
and Hagana represent only 23% of the variance of 
cabinet rank (R = .48), the rest being attributed to un­
known variables.
EGYPT
The patterns derived from the factor analysis of the 
Egyptian elite data suggested five independent variables 
for path analysis. On the basis of Egyptian history and 
politics, Model I presents a causal hierarchy of variables, 
except religion and age, which are considered ascriptive 
and therefore not acquired. There exist many weak 
linkages (as indicated by low correlations and broken 
lines) which are eliminated by the use of prediction 
equations; hence the elimination of education, since it 
does not seem to influence the other variables.
The results are shown in Model II. Religion in­
fluences occupation; this is explained by the over­
whelming number of Muslims in the revolutionary of­
ficers group as well as the large majority of Muslims in 
the total cabinet elite. Age- the political generation 
cohort—seems to influence occupational status (.17) 
and core cadre membership (.14). This finding seems 
consistent with the Egyptian elite’s evolution after the 
1952 Revolution. As in other revolutionary milieux, 
belonging to the generational cohort which led the 
revolution is significant for political mobility and en­
trance into top leadership cadres and ultimately to 
longevity at the top. Thuss belonging to the military 
revolutionary age cohort influences membership in the 
core cadres around Nasir directly, and through occupa­
tional status (the military being the highest) indirectly. 
Membership in this particular age group and a military 
occupation increases the chances of entering the top 
leadership group (core cadre) where one’s relationship
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to the leader determines tenure in cabinet.47 The cu­
mulative effect on tenure is expressed by the standard­
ized regression coefficient of R = .68. The amount of 
variation explained by core cadre membership as in­
dependent variable is R2=(.68)2=.46 or 46%. Thus, 
social background variables explain 46% of the in­
fluence on tenure; the unexplained variance was 
54%—mostly attributable to personal gifts, and 
systemic and environmental factors and error.
Since core cadre emerges as a uniquely strong predic­
tor of tenure, one is tempted to identify the sources 
and amounts of influence on it. This is calculated by 
utilizing the multiple correlation coefficient R?23=.21 
or 21% which represents the amount of variance ex­
plained by variables 2 and 3—occupational status and 
age.48 Thus, there must exist other unknown variables 
contributing to core cadre.
LEBANON
The factor patterns of the Lebanese data suggest the 
centrality of five independent variables as presented in 
Model I. The causal arrows are derived from the 
historical and political realities of Lebanon. As in the 
previous cases, weak correlational links have been 
eliminated by prediction equations and the results are 
presented in Model II.
One striking feature of the path diagram (Model ID is 
the élimination of all causal linkages originating from 
sectarianism. The resulting removal of sectarianism as a 
causal variable was unexpected considering the central 
recruitment role of Lebanon’s seven religious sects as 
indicated by the factor patterns. Another striking 
feature is the negative influence of education on 
Assembly membership and occupational status. 
However, education (level) exercises a direct influence 
on cabinet tenure (.11). More significant is the influence 
of occupational status both on za’imism (.19) and on 
Assembly membership (.09), which in turn has an effect 
on za’imism (.06). The contribution of za’imism to 
cabinet tenure is considerable (.78)—a finding that was 
in accord with our expectations.
In sum, there are two direct effects on tenure—from 
education (.11) and from za’imism (.78). Despite its 
smaller influence, the effect of education is not negligi­
ble since it indicates the importance of specialization in 
the cabinet—a dimension that relates to the moderniza-
47. Dekmejian, Patterns...,pp. 179-84.
48. This is calculated by the formula
R2. „= r2|2+r2|3-2rl2fl3r23
23 I r2
I - r 23
On this calculation see, Garson, Handbook.... p. 197. No tests of 
statistical significance are necessary since we are dealing with the 
whole universe.
tion process. Za’imism is a powerful influence on 
tenure and reflects the prominent position of this type 
of traditional leader in Lebanon. This may suggest that 
the more prominent a za’im, the greater his longevity 
in cabinet office.
Overall, the amount of variance explained by za’im­
ism and education is calcutated as R2= .57 or 57%. 
Thus, unexplainable variance— .43 or 43%—can be at­
tributed to other situational and personality variables as 
well as to error. Similarly, it is possible to investigate the 
origins of influence upon za’imism—the strongest in­
dependent variable. Here, Assembly and occupation ex­
plain only 44% of the variance on za’imism and 56% is 
unexplained and attributed to error and other variables 
not accounted for in this study.
comparative perspectives
The findings of the foregoing tri-country study sug­
gest a number of cross-national generalizations, mixed 
with some words of caution. Considering the limita­
tions of the type of data used here, as well as the possi­
ble shortcomings inherent in the measurement of 
variables, one should be careful to-view any conclusions 
as tentative. As one studies the three factor solutions, 
the patterns of religion and specialization manifest 
cross-national significance. The religious dimension is 
particularly salient in Lebanon’s sectarian politics and 
Israel’s multi-party coalition where religious parties 
play a crucial role. Egypt, in contrast, displays a strong 
specialization pattern, both occupationally and educa­
tionally. Of course specialization also appears in the fac­
tor profiles of Istradi and Lebanese elites, as does 
religion in the Egyptian case, but not in the first pat­
tern. Three other patterns appear as system-specific 
features of each elite group—Zionist bureaucracy, 
generational cohort (core cadre), and za’imism. Upon 
closer examination, one might discern a rough 
equivalence between Israel’s Ben Gurionite bureaucratic 
contingent, membership in Egypt’s revolutionary cadre 
and accession to the ranks of Lebanon’s za’ims. These 
seem to be primary sources of elite recruitment.
Overall recruitment patterns tend to correspond with the 
societal characteristics of the three polities (hypothesis 1). 
Israel and Lebanon, as democratic societies, exhibit a 
system-continuity pattern where traditional values and 
symbols are still politically influential, but coexistent with 
the inexorable trend toward modernization, particularly in 
Israel. In Egypt, military officers and technocratic specialists 
were brought to the cabinet by Nasir reflecting an ostensible 
revolutionary system’s break with tradition and commit­
ment to modernization. This was in sharp contrast to 
the prevalence of Israeli bureaucrat-politicians and 
Lebanese Za’ims-politicians, who possessed lower levels 
of specialization. Additionally, it is significant that the
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party factor is manifest only in Israel, reflecting the lack 
of strong party structures in Egypt and Lebanon.
Despite the apparent comparability of these findings, 
the question of equivalence can not be overlooked. 
While both Israel and Lebanon registered a strong 
religious pattern, Lebanese sects and Israel’s religious 
parties play substantially different system-specific roles. 
On the other hand, it is relatively easier to achieve 
equivalence in comparing occupation, education and 
particularly tenure—the common dependent variable 
used in path analysis. Yet even in these cases, it may be 
well to remember that variables often change their 
meanings in differing cultures and over time; a given 
length of tenure may assume politically dissimilar 
meanings in different environments.
The causal relationship between social background 
characteristics of leaders and tenure (hypothesis 2) was 
confirmed, to a considerable degree by the path analysis 
technique. Of course, the causal models are not intend­
ed as substitutes for reality, but only as approximations 
of it. Thus, the three causal models seem to suggest that 
longevity in high office is directly and perhaps more 
strongly influenced by a leader’s associational affilia­
tions rather than personal attributes or early socializa­
tion. These models may suggest further that an aspirant’s 
success in entering a key recruitment pool or membership 
in a systemically important cohort—i.e., ranking Zionist 
bureaucrat, core cadre revolutionaries—strongly in­
fluences his tenure in cabinet. One should emphasize the 
role of chance in deciding the membership of these key 
recruitment pools; for example, a generational cohort is 
largely determined by the accident of being bom at a par­
ticular time and place.
Methodologically, the application of factor analysis 
and causal modelling to the study of elite recruitment 
we consider useful, although problems remain in 
measurement and equivalence. Choosing data 
categories and scaling may significantly affect the sen­
sitivity of the causal process and consequently the ac­
curacy of the findings. A number of existing pos­
sibilities for further research become manifest. One 
is the comparative study of pathways of elite mobility 
by the use of path analysis in conjunction with Markov 
Chain and other stochastic techniques. Also it is possi­
ble to use a larger number of independent variables if 
additional data (for example psychological) is available. 
One might further experiment with dependent variables 
other than tenure; for example, social background 
variables may by useful in predicting elite policy 
choices or levels of mobility in entering different elite 
cohorts. A related task is to use path analysis and 
similar methods to identify opportunity structures that 
would affect the chances of aspirants for political office. 
Thus, one may delineate the prerequisite conditions 
and operating standards for admission into the political 
elites of different countries.
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